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COMMENT ON THE PATMAN REPORT
JAN Z. KRA NowIoI t AN) AmxAm BODS]KY
The Board of Editors of Volume 112 believes that many important and
timely issues fail to receive the attention they deserve because the normal
format of a law review Article demands extensive research which already
overburdened members of the legal profession often cannot afford. The Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review intends to alleviate this problem by pub-
lishing, from time to time, well-considered Comments on current topics by
members of the judiciary, teaching profession, and bar. The following Com-
ment analyzes the recommendations of the recent Patman Report dealing with
the tax treatment of charitable foundations.
In an address before the New York University Conference on
Charitable Foundations, Professor Albert M. Sacks observed: "Con-
cern about philanthropy, and in particular about philanthropic founda-
tions, seems to go through a cyclical pattern: a period of quiet content-
ment, and then a time of alarm and crisis." Federal and state policy
toward private charitable giving, Professor Sacks urged, should pursue
a steady course of assessment and reassessment, an "even pace, in
quiet as well as unruly times." 1
We should recall this advice now. For we have entered upon
another crisis-perhaps, as some would have it, upon "unruly times."
The publication in December 1962 of a report by Representative
Wright Patman entitled Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable
Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy 2 has created an unprecedented
stir not only in foundation and tax circles but in the public press.3
There are signs that the issues raised by Representative Patman will
not die easily. The Internal Revenue Service has already acted to
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1951, B.C.L.
1952, M.A. 1955, Oxford; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University. Member, Illinois Bar.
*B.A. 1929, M.A. 1933, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1943, Temple Uni-
versity. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. Mr. Brodsky is a member of a special sub-
committee of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association formed to study the Patman Report.
1 Sacks, Use and Misuse of the Private Foundation, in NEW YoRK UNIvERsrrY
FIFr BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS, PROCEEDINGS 203, 204
(1961). The last serious crisis in Congress occurred in 1950. See Hearings on the
Revenue Revision of 1950 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). It had a fairly mild sequel in certain changes in the Revenue
Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 957. There followed several congressional investigations
to inquire into alleged un-American activities of charitable foundations. See Hearings
Before a Special Committee To Investigate Tax Exempt Foundations, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2681 (1954) ; WoRmsER, FOUNDATIONS: THEIR PowER AND INFLUENCE (1958).
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TAx-ExE=r FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEr ImPACT ON OUR EcoN-
oMY (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as CHAIRmAN'S REPORT].
3 See New York Times, Aug. 23, 1962, p. 14, col. 4; Wall Street Journal, Aug.
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intensify its auditing of tax-exempt organizations and to tighten the
reporting requirements.4
Although the bulk of the Patman Report is devoted to findings
based on a study of 534 tax-exempt foundations covering the period
1951 through 1960, the seventeen recommendations 5 present the most
interesting portion of the Report. It is to these recommendations that
this Comment is devoted.
The Report calls for reforms in three principal areas of foundation
activity: (1) foundation control of business enterprises; (2) foundation
influence over business; (3) administrative supervision over founda-
tions. However, the Report does not remain consistently within the
confines of its subject matter. For example, Recommendation 9
would postpone the charitable deduction for any contribution to a
foundation until the contributed asset is actually disbursed or dis-
tributed by the foundation to some charitable use. Recommendation 11
would confine the charitable deduction to the cost basis or value (which-
ever is lower) of the contributed asset. Recommendation 12 would
deny the five percent corporate charitable deduction in any taxable
year during which the corporation has elected subchapter S ' treatment,
thereby eliminating the advantage of an additional deduction which
under present law enures to the benefit of the shareholders. Recom-
mendation 16 would exclude from the adjusted gross estate, upon
which the maximum marital deduction is calculated, gifts made to
charity, thus reducing the maximum marital deduction. 7 These recom-
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1 (a) (4) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6645, 1963-17 Cum.
BuL. 10; see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1, 27 Fed. Reg. 10489 (1962).
5
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 133-35.
6Under IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77, a small business corporation may
elect to be taxed essentially as a partnership.
7 This recommendation is related to potential abuse of the charitable foundation
device in only one striking instance. Suppose a donor, during his lifetime, creates a
charitable foundation in the unincorporated trust form. Under the foundation trust
instrument he retains the power during his lifetime, alone or in conjunction with
other foundation trustees, to distribute the corpus and income among such charitable
objects as he, and they, may from time to time determine. By virtue of an express
provision in the "Clifford" sections of the Code, the retention by him of this power
does not cause the income of the foundation trust to become taxable to him. TNT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 674(b) (4). However, under the estate tax sections of the Code,
the retention of this power by the donor until his death will cause the value of all of
the assets contributed by him and the accumulated income thereon to be included in
the gross estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038. There is, in the estate tax
sections, nothing corresponding to § 674(b) (4). The value of the contributed assets
and accumulated income of the foundation trust, having been included in the gross
estate of the donor, will, of course, be deductible under § 2055. The net effect of this
inclusion and deduction, however, is to increase the maximum marital deduction
available to the donor's estate because such maximum is computed without reference
to the deduction for charitable contributions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2056(c)
(2) (A). Thus, through this arrangement, the donor may have during his lifetime
secured the benefit of a deduction or deductions against income for his contributions
to the foundation trust and taken advantage of the exclusion from his gross income
of the income produced by the donated assets, and yet, upon his death the maximum
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mendations are not confined to transactions which directly affect
business control or activity, but are addressed broadly to the policy of
our present law of charitable giving. This illustrates the Report's
basic weakness to stray, sometimes confusingly, beyond the area of
immediate concern-foundation impact on the economy.
In preparing this Comment, however, we have been mindful that
the Patman Report is not a document written by lawyers for lawyers
and that it cannot, therefore, be tested in the first instance by the
rigorous standards of precision and consistency demanded of lawyers.
Rather, we have felt that an effective evaluation of the Report demands
that where the Report fails to make the necessary distinctions, they
be supplied; that where it is inconsistent in its recommendations, they
be accepted as alternatives; that where it fails to define or narrow the
scope of its criticisms or of its subject matter, definitions be proposed
which are consistent with the context. In short, we will address our
evaluation to the sense which the Report can make, not to the nonsense
that may be discovered therein.
I. DEFINING THE ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH THE
RECOMMENDATIONS APPLY
The Report refers to "foundations and charitable trusts" as the
objects of the investigation, but does not expressly define these terms.
In exploring Recommendation 1, which places a twenty-five-year
limitation on the life of foundations, Representative Patman states:
"I believe that all foundations and charitable trusts should be obliged
to distribute to charities and beneficiaries [under a program which]
. . . will result in the complete distribution of all assets . . . at the
end of 25 years of [their] . . . existence." Implicit in this statement
is a distinction between organizations which merely administer funds
for distribution to charities, and charities which are actively engaged
in charitable work. Indeed, Representative Patman's investigation was
for the most part confined to organizations of the former sort; the
Report indicates that the information was largely obtained from income
tax form 990-A.' Speaking generally, this form need not be filed by
hospitals, schools, churches, public charities supported in whole or in
part by public contributions,9 or by those pension, profit-sharing, and
stock bonus plans which are qualified under section 401 (a).'
marital deduction available to his estate will be increased by reference to value of the
assets contributed by him, for which he had obtained a charitable deduction against
income, and by reference to the accumulated income on such assets, which he never
included in his gross income.
8 See CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 38-50; cf. id. at 2.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(g) (1958).
10 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(a) (2) (1958).
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These factors, along with the spirit and text of the entire Report,
indicate that, instead of encompassing all section 501 (c) (3) " organi-
zations, the Report deals only with organizations which do not engage
directly in charitable work, but which distribute funds to institutions
and persons that do.
II. FOUNDATION CONTROL OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
In his discussion of foundation control of business, Representative
Patman does not distinguish dearly between foundations that are inde-
pendent of their creator and those under the control or influence of
their creator in some appropriate tax sense.' Thus, some of Repre-
sentative Patman's recommendations have general application, while
others apply only to controlled foundations.
A. Recommendations of General Applicability
1. Recommendations Which Would Discourage Any Foundation
Control of Business
In Recommendation 6, Representative Patman states: "In my
view, all foundations should be limited to ownership of no more than
three percent of the stock of a corporation and should not be allowed
to vote stock." We may take this recommendation in the narrow
sense, namely, that it calls for a denial of federal tax qualification as
a charity and a denial of tax exemption to any foundation which
violates the stated limitation. It could, of course, be taken more
broadly to call for state and federal laws which would implement the
proposed limitation in other, non-tax, ways.
Overlapping and to some extent inconsistent with Recommenda-
tion 6 is Recommendation 2 that "tax exempt foundations should be
prohibited from engaging in business directly or indirectly." Repre-
sentative Patman explains the word "indirectly" by stating: "Founda-
tions controlling corporations engaged in business, through the extent
of stock ownership in those corporations, should themselves be deemed
to be engaged in that business." This recommendation can be given
several interpretations. If it calls for denial of qualification as a charity
and a denial of tax exemption to any foundation which controls a
11 Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual . . . [shall be exempt from taxation].
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3).
1
2 E.g., IN?. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78 (treatment of grantors and others as
substantial owners for tax purposes).
19631
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corporation, it overlaps Recommendation 6 and is inconsistent with it,
at least with respect to the proposed tests of control. It is, perhaps,
more reasonable to suppose that Recommendation 2 is intended to
work an expansion of section 512 13 rather than an expansion of section
504 14 or 503 (c) ; ' that it is intended to tax to the foundation any
income received from a controlled corporation without withdrawing
the charitable qualification or tax exemption as to other receipts.
Assuming, arguendo, that businesses should not be allowed to
remain under foundation control for any period, however short, the
approach of Recommendation 2, as we interpret it, seems preferable to
the approach of Recommendation 6. Both recommendations would
discourage charitable giving of large blocks of stock. Recommenda-
tion 6, however, would have a greater tendency to produce this result
because, by depriving the donee foundation of charitable status, it
would deny any charitable deduction to the donor. Recommendation
2, on the other hand, if interpreted as supposed, would not deny the
charitable deduction. Rather, it would tax the foundation on income
from a controlled business, thereby influencing the foundation to divest
itself of the controlling holdings. Under Recommendation 2, a donor
who does not desire to continue his influence over the business, but
who would prefer that control should not pass to unknown interests,
would clearly be discouraged from making the gift at all.
On the merits, there is little in favor of a policy which prevents
foundation control of business for even a short period. The price for
such a policy, the discouragement of a substantial amount of charitable
giving, is too high, especially when the policy would be applied without
regard to other factors, such as the presence or absence of continued
control or influence by the donor.
2. Recommendations Which Would Discourage Long-Term
Foundation Control of Business
Recommendation 1 is one of Representative Patman's most chal-
lenging proposals: "In my view, consideration should be given to a
limitation of 25 years on the life of foundations instead of allowing
them to exist in perpetuity."
On its face, the recommendation requires the liquidation of all
foundations twenty-five years after their inception, regardless of
whether the foundation is or is not in a position to make an "impact
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §512.
14 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 504.
1 5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 503(c) (prohibited transactions which will deny
exemption).
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on the economy" in some objectionable sense. This is much too
sweeping a reform for the supposed evils which it is designed to curb.
For the recommendation to be meaningful, we must assume that it
would be applicable only to foundations which control business enter-
prises. Further, if control of business is the objection, the recom-
mendation should be narrowed to a requirement that the foundation
liquidate its controlling interests within twenty-five years of their
acquisition rather than that the foundation itself be liquidated.
There are some details which must be supplied even if the recom-
mendation is narrowed in the proposed manner. Should the governing
instrument or the terms of the gift have to direct divestiture within
twenty-five years in order to obtain the charitable deduction, or should
a wait-and-see rule be adopted? What steps should be taken to prevent
the divested controlling interest from finding its way into the hands
of another foundation for another twenty-five-year period? In addi-
tion, Representative Patman clearly envisages that the liquidation of a
foundation would be in favor of charitable institutions, yet, surely some
of the objections to perpetual control of businesses by the foundations
dealt with in the Report are equally applicable to perpetual control by
charitable institutions.
A twenty-five year divestiture requirement, properly worked out,
may not have as adverse an effect on charitable giving as would the
proposals of Recommendations 2 and 6. Taken as an alternative to
those proposals, Recommendation 1 merits careful consideration.
B. Tax Treatment of Foundations Under the Control or Influence
of Their Creator
Recommendation 9 not only denies a donor any deduction for
contributions to a foundation under his control until the contributed
assets are actually distributed, but also taxes the controlling donor
for income earned by the foundation until put to charitable use."8 The
exact scope of this proposal is unclear. For the test of control, Repre-
sentative Patman refers us to subpart E of subchapter J of the Code."
16 In my view, a contributor should not be allowed a deduction for payments
to a foundation that he controls until the foundation actually uses the money
for charity. The foundation should be recognized as being the alter ego of
the controlling contributor. Income earned by the foundation should be tax-
able to the controlling contributor until put to charitable use.
These principles can be implemented by treating controlled foundations the
way the tax law now does trusts (Subchapter J, Chapter 1, Internal Revenue
Code) ....
All foundations controlled by the same individual, family, or company
should be treated as one, in determining whether control exists or whether
the foundations have been used for personal advantage.
Canxnua.x's REPoRT 133-34.
17 IxT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 671-78.
19631,
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He states that foundations should be treated "the way the tax law
now does trusts." 18
Under the present law, however, the income of a charitable trust
is not attributable to the settlor unless he has a reversionary interest
which may reasonably be expected to take effect within ten years; 9
unless he has a power to revoke the trust at any time; or unless he
may receive the income directly or indirectly without the consent of
an adverse party. 0 In a private trust, the power to determine the
beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of the trust will gen-
erally open the settlor to taxation upon the income of the trust. This
effect, however, is expressly denied in the case of a charitable trust.21
Under present law, the fact that a person other than the settlor has
considerable control over the distribution of the corpus and income of
the trust and over its administration, does not, unless the power can be
used for his personal benefit, cause such person to be taxed upon the
income of the trust, even when the trust is not a charitable one.22
It is true that, under existing law, if the foundation is incorporated,
the rules applicable to the settlor of a trust under subpart E, subchapter
J would not be applicable to the creator of the foundation. However,
the extension of these rules to the creator of an incorporated founda-
tion would not work a significant change in the law unless the rules
of subpart E, subchapter J were themselves revised. At the present
time, if the creator of an incorporated foundation were to provide
that the foundation may be dissolved by him, or by anyone else, and its
assets distributed to him or for some nonexempt purpose, the founda-
tion would not be given charitable qualification. Indeed, the Treasury
Regulations state that, "an organization does not meet the organiza-
tional test [of section 501 (c) (3)] if its articles or the law of the State
in which it was created provide that its assets would, upon dissolution,
be distributed to its members or shareholders." ' Thus, if the creator
of an incorporated foundation were to retain, as a formal matter, the
powers which would render him taxable under sections 673(a) and
(b), 676, and 677 with regard to the income of a trust, the incor-
porated foundation would not qualify as a charity. Similarly, if any-
one other than the creator of an incorporated foundation were to be
given the powers which would render him taxable under section 678
with regard to the income of a trust, the incorporated foundation would
not qualify as a charity.
I8 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 134.
19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673(a).
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§673(a)-(b), 676-77.
21 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 674(b) (4).
2 2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 678.
2 3 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (4) (1959).
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Thus the only effect of extending the treatment of these sections
to the incorporated foundation would be to render the creator (or
other persons who have a section 678-type power over the foundation)
taxable on all of the income of the foundation, although not distributed
to them. At the same time, the foundation, having lost its exemption,
would be required to pay a tax at ordinary corporate rates. We do
not expose the shareholders of a business corporation to this treatment,
and there is no reason to recommend it in this case.
There is a significant difference between the controlling share-
holder of a business corporation and the creator or others who have
retained control over a corporate foundation. The controlling share-
holder of a business corporation does not obtain a charitable deduction
for his investments in the corporation. Under present law, however,
when an organization has initially qualified as a charitable foundation,
a loss of charitable status as a result of subsequent activities or trans-
actions does not disturb the deductions that have previously been
obtained by its creator or other contributors.
Retention by the creator or others of rights or powers that would
cause the incorporated foundation to disqualify as a charity from its
inception should not also cause the creator or others to be taxed on
the income of the foundation unless this result can be justified under
the rules of corporate taxation.
A different situation is presented when the objectionable relation-
ship to the foundation arises after the creation of the foundation or
when the retained control offers a potential for securing private benefits
in the future. On this point there is a vast difference in philosophy
and result between the rules applicable to trusts and those applicable
to the incorporated foundation.
For example, it is no answer to Representative Patman's proposal
that the powers listed in section 675 are for the most part covered by
section 503 (c). Under section 503 (c) the incorporated foundation
does not lose its charitable status until it has in fact conferred the
prohibited benefits upon the creator2 4  That the control retained by
the creator offered a potential for this is immaterial. Charitable de-
ductions obtained prior to the taxable year in which the exemption is
lost are not recalled under section 503 (e).25 Even after the loss of
24 Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 503(a) (1) (A), a foundation will lose its
§ 501(a) exemption only "if it has engaged in a prohibited transaction." (Emphasis
added.) Note that, under the trust rules, the philosophy of waiting until the benefit
is in fact conferred is adopted only, and uniquely, in the case of support trusts. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 677(b), 678(c).
25 "No gift . . . shall be allowed as a deduction if made to an organization
described in section 501 (c) (3) which, in the taxable year of the organization in which
the gift or bequest is made, is not exempt under section 501(a) by reason of this
1963l
198 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the exemption, due to some prohibited transaction which benefits the
creator, the creator does not become taxable on the income of an
incorporated foundation-as he might be if trust rules were applicable.
Representative Patman's proposal to treat controlled foundations "the
way the tax law does trusts" has the merit of drawing our attention to
a serious shortcoming of the present tax policy towards donor con-
trolled foundations-a shortcoming which is significant without refer-
ence to its effect on business growth and competition. It draws our
attention, also, to some shortcomings that are directly relevant to
business activity. For example, while loans actually made in favor
of the creator are covered in section 503 (c), the tax exemption is lost
only if such a loan is not adequately secured or does not bear a reason-
able rate of interest.
Under section 675 (3) the grantor of a trust is taxable on its in-
come not only when a loan to him is inadequately secured and bears
inadequate interest, but also when the loan was made to him by a
trustee who is related, subordinate, or subservient, or when the
grantor, as trustee, lends to himself. In this situation, section 503 (c)
clearly would not deny tax exemption, but section 675 (c), if applicable
to incorporated foundations, would render the creator taxable on the in-
come of the foundation. It is noteworthy at this point that Represen-
tative Patman has strong objections to any foundation which engages in
commercial lending,26 and this activity is not, at present, covered by
sections 675(2), 503(c), or 504(a) (3). We will discuss the effect of
an extension of section 675 (1)- (3) to incorporated foundations and
Representative Patman's objections to commercial lending, in the next
major section of this Comment, "Foundation Influence Over Business."
The effect of section 675 (4), however, is directly related to-our
present consideration of the treatment of foundation control of business
when the creator remains in control of the foundation. Under section
675(4) (A) and (B) a grantor of a trust becomes taxable on the
income of the trust when any person has the power "in a non-fiduciary
capacity" to vote or direct the voting of stock or other securities in
a corporation "in which the holdings of the grantor and the trust are
significant from the viewpoint of voting control" or when such person
has power to control the investment of the trust funds "to the extent
that the trust funds consist of stocks or securities of corporations in
which the holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant from the
section." INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §501(e). (Emphasis added.). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.503 (e) -1(c) (1958) offers an example which suggests that the Service will seek
to disallow, as to a donor who has participated in the prohibited transaction, any
deductions taken by him on prior returns which are still open.
2 6 "Commercial money lending and borrowing by foundations should be banned."
Recommendation 3, CH n Axm's REPORT 133.
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viewpoint of voting control." There is no case law construing these
provisions, presumably because it has always been comparatively easy
to establish that administrative powers are exercisable in a "fiduciary
capacity" when other beneficiaries are affected and when there is no
clear indication of a contrary intent on the part of the grantorY Sec-
tion 675(4), if extended to incorporated foundations, would pre-
sumably continue to have little significance, unless we are willing to
say that a retained power in the creator to vote the stock held by a
foundation or to direct its investments should be presumed to be
exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity because the only beneficiary, the
state, has little time to police its exercise. This presumption touches
one of the fundamental issues posed by foundation giving-the extent
to which we can, in deciding upon appropriate tax treatment, assume
proper policing of foundation activities both at the state and federal
level. This topic will be discussed in the last major section of this
Comment, "Administrative Supervision Over Foundations."
One further difficulty with the application of section 675(4) to
incorporated foundations is that section 675(4) is apparently inappli-
cable when a grantor has transferred all of the voting stock of the
corporation to the trust and so has no further "holdings" in the
corporation which can be affected by the manner in which the stock
is voted or administered. Representative Patman clearly would not
want this situation to remain unaffected by his proposals.
C. Forcing the Creator of a Tax Exempt Foundation Which Controls
a Business To Sever His Relationship With the Foundation: A
Fundamental Issue of Policy
The proposal in Recommendation 9 to tax the controlling creator
on the income of the foundation, at least when the foundation controls
a business, raises a fundamental issue which is, perhaps, impossible of
resolution.
There are two major effects of foundation control of business
which cause concern. One is the dampening effect which such control
may have on the business controlled; the other is the unfair competi-
tive advantage which a foundation-controlled business may have over
others. It is the second of these concerns which one would expect to
be emphasized by the Committee on Small Business, and it was the
second which Representative Patman in fact emphasized. But when
we address ourselves to the health of the economy in general, both
effects of foundation control should be explored.
27 Conpare ScoTT, TRUSTS § 185 (2d ed. 1956) and Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y.
114, 123 N.E. 135 (1916), and Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (Sup.
Ct. 1957), with Ditmars v. Camden Trust Co., 10 N.J. Super. 306, 76 A.2d 280 (1950),
and State Street Trust Company v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
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Although it would be imprudent to try to explore them here, we
can at least note that if the concern is that a business will become mori-
bund in the hands of foundation trustees, the least desirable action is to
penalize the creator's personal participation in the running of a business
he once owned. If, on the other hand, noncompetitive growth of the
business is the concern, there are better solutions, such as the twenty-
five-year divestiture requirement. In this respect, some of Repre-
sentative Patman's suggestions involving unreasonable accumulations
of income, particularly Recommendation 15 2 dealing with section 531
accumulations by the foundation-controlled corporation, deserve careful
thought.
D. Foundation Control of Business and the Dead Hand
Distinguishable from whether the creator's personal participation
in the conduct of a foundation-controlled business should be dis-
couraged is the question whether the creator ought to be permitted to
control its business policies after his death. Apart from the twenty-
five-year divestiture proposal and the proposal prohibiting control of
business for any period, Representative Patman has no specific recom-
mendation directed to this question.
Under both federal and state law, the creator of a foundation in
trust form can go quite far in leaving directions with the foundation
trustees as to how the business will be conducted. Recently, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held such a foundation a valid charitable
trust entitled to exist in perpetuity although the trust instrument
directed, inter alia, that the trustees vote for the nominees of the
existing directors; that they cause the corporation to set aside $4.00
per share before any bonuses are paid; and that they ensure that the
bonuses, if any, are paid in certain proportions between officers and
employees.29 Surely these provisions, even if no one has standing to
enforce them,"0 tend to effect a dynastic perpetuation of a particular
28 Corporations controlled by foundations should be subject to the unrea-
sonable accumulation earnings tax in section 531 of the Code. At present,
that tax is imposed where dividends are held back to save tax for stockholders.
It should also apply where dividends are held back to save the existence of
unreasonable accumulations for foundations otherwise exempt from tax.
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 134.
29 Scholler Trust, 403 Pa. 97, 169 A.2d 554 (1961), affirming 20 Pa. D. & C.2d
318, 333 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
30 D'Arcangelo v. D'Arcangelo, 137 N.J. Eq. 63, 43 A.2d 169 (Ch. 1945) ; In re
Feinson's Estate, 196 Misc. 590, 92 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Surr. Ct. 1949); In re Koffend's
Will, 218 Minn. 206, 216-18, 15 N.W.2d 590, 596-97 (1944) (direction that testator's
widow be employed as an officer and voted a salary of $3,600 upheld, although she
was dead at the time of suit). None of these cases, however, involved the question
of whether the person designated by the settlor to be elected, employed, or continued
in office with the corporation has any right to enforce the provisions of the trust in-
strument. In D'Arcangelo the court stated in dictum that a direction to cause a
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management, to discourage the payment of larger dividends, and to
encourage the distribution of most of the corporation's income as
bonuses to its employees. It could also be argued that because the trust
instrument instructs the trustees to assure the foundation of a $4.00
dividend per share, the net effect is to discourage them from making
any further effort to secure larger distributions when these are justified
by the earnings of the corporation, and thus to encourage them to let
the rest of the earnings go out in bonuses.
III. FOUNDATION INFLUENCE OVER BUSINESS
It is, of course, impossible to distinguish sharply between the
issues raised by foundation control over business and those raised by
foundation influence over business. However, we have attempted to
preserve some such distinction in this Comment to sharpen, if possible,
the understanding of the Patman Report.
In Recommendation 3, Representative Patman proposes that
"ccommercial money lending and borrowing by foundations should be
banned." This proposal, presumably, covers both lending to the
creator and lending to the world at large. We have noted already
that Representative Patman's proposal in Recommendation 9, with
reference to loans by a foundation to its creator, would go beyond the
present law under section 503 (c) (1) to the extent that it works an
extension of section 675(1)-(3) to incorporated foundations. It
would discourage any lending to the creator in a case where the
foundation is under his control or the control of related or subordinate
parties, even though adequately secured and at a reasonable interest rate.
There is considerable merit to the proposals in both recommenda-
tions. The creator of the foundation should not be encouraged to look
forward to his foundation as an "easy bank." While the adequacy of
the security can be easily determined, it is certainly harder to say
what is a "reasonable rate of interest." A low rate of interest which
cannot be obtained quickly and easily on the market need not be un-
reasonable, yet it does put the creator in a business advantage over
competitors who do not have an "easy bank." The "easy bank" is,
wholly owned corporation to employ a designated person may be "enforced," but it
does not state by whom. The courts draw a distinction between trust directions which
evidence merely an intention to guide the trustee in the exercise of his discretion and
directions which are intended to give a beneficial interest to some third party. It seems
clear that the courts are reluctant to find an intention of the latter sort. It may be
that if the third party is a close member of the settlor's family or is a trusted old
friend, such an intention will be found to exist. See It re Hand's Estate, 349 Pa.
11, 36 A.2d 485 (1944) ; In re Platt's Will, 205 Wis. 290, 237 N.W. 109 (1931) ; Note,
Testamentary Designation of an Attorney, 1958 Wis. L. Rxv. 322; Krasnowiecki,
Existing Rides of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the Trustee-Controlled
Business Enterprise, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 816 (1962).
202 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:190
after all, kept going at the expense of all taxpayersY' In this connec-
tion, Representative Patman's Recommendation 10," which appears to
do no more than to restate the accepted policy of section 503 (c),
should be read as an urgent call for a reexamination of the efficacy of
that and similar provisions in the Code, and should not be dismissed
lightly.
Recommendation 3, so far as it relates to commercial lending in
general, also deserves some consideration. Representative Patman's
position, and it does not seem unreasonable, is that foundations can
acquire considerable influence over business through their lending.
Representative Patman's Recommendation 4 is that, "A founda-
tion should not be permitted to use its funds to grant benefits to a
controlled company's employees." This, he says, is quite a competitive
advantage. In view of the fact that employee benefit plans are tax
exempt under section 401,11 this recommendation challenges an estab-
lished tax policy with ramifications far outside the field of foundation
activity. Beyond noting this fact, we feel that comment on the merits
would be inappropriate at this time.
Earlier we categorized Mr. Patman's suggestion for a twenty-five-
year divestiture requirement as one of the most challenging that he
has presented. Perhaps equally challenging are those suggestions ad-
dressed to the problem of unreasonable accumulations. In Recom-
mendation 15," Representative Patman notes that section 531 " does
not reach accumulations of a business corporation the sole stockholder
of which is a tax-exempt foundation. This result obtains because the
tax is imposed only when the corporation has been "availed of for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders."
Representative Patman recommends that the tax should be imposed
also "where dividends are held back to save the existence of unreason-
able accumulations for foundations otherwise exempt from tax."
31 See Donald G. Griswold, 39 T.C. 620 (1962).
832 Exemption should be denied if a foundation has been formed or availed
of for tax avoidance purposes or to get financial benefits for the contributor.
Conversely, a controlled corporation should not be allowed a contribution to
a foundation, but instead the payment should be considered as a dividend to
the controlling stockholder where the amount is significant and the foundation
is unrelated to the business purpose of the corporation.
The tax law says that a foundation's earnings may not inure to the benefit
of any private individual. It should be made clear that "individual" includes
corporations and trustees.
Contributions made by a foundation in the name of a controlling individual,
or in relief of a controlling individual's obligation, should be regarded as using
foundation earnings for the benefit of the individual.
CHAInRw.AN's REPORT 134.
33 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
84 See note 28 .mpra.
35 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
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Obviously, a foundation-owned corporation which plans to em-
bark on a program of expansion is at some advantage over its com-
petitors who have to deal with dividend-conscious stockholders. In
addition, although the high purpose and sense of duty of most founda-
tion trustees cannot be questioned, there are exceptions to the general
rule. There is no law which prohibits foundation trustees from serv-
ing as officers or directors of the controlled corporation. Salaries of
officers and directors are challenged openly only by shareholders or by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue if claimed as a corporate de-
duction, and then only if they are disproportionate to the magnitude of
the enterprise. If we are concerned with the competitive advantages
which a foundation-controlled business has over others, if we desire
to control their growth rather than their atrophy in the hands of a
foundation, then Representative Patman's recommendation ought to be
taken seriously-at least insofar as his recommendation calls for an
extension of section 531 tax to accumulations of income by a foundation-
controlled business enterprise.
Recommendation 15 goes further, however, and calls for a rule
which would aggregate the accumulations in the business enterprise and
the accumulations in the foundation. It is not clear whether the sanc-
tion would be to apply the surtax to the accumulations within the
corporation only; apply the surtax to the aggregate accumulations;
deny a tax exemption to the foundation; or apply some combination of
these sanctions. The tax exemption is, at present, denied if the amount
accumulated by the foundation is "unreasonable in amount or duration
in order to carry out" its charitable functions."6
Representative Patman's investigation showed that accumulations
of income reported for the ten-year study period from 1951 through
1960 rose from $271,615,733 in 1951, to $906,136,256 in 1960.3" The
prohibition against unreasonable accumulations by tax-exempt founda-
tions was introduced into the Code by the Revenue Act of 1950.' s It
is interesting to note that the House bill sought to restrict the exemption
to income which is actually distributed to charity within two and a
half months of the taxable year of receipt.3 9 The Senate rejected this
approach on the ground that it might injure charitable projects."
Unreasonable accumulations within the foundation present, it
seems to us, different considerations than those involved in unreason-
36 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 504(a) (1).
37 CHAzmmA's REPORT 114-28.
38 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 944, § 3814(1), 64 Stat. 958 (1950).
3 H.R. REP. No. 12317, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41, 115-23 (1950).
40 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1950).
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able accumulations within the foundation-controlled business corpora-
tion. The latter has an immediate impact on business growth and
competition. Unreasonable accumulations within the foundation, how-
ever, may portend a concentration of economic power in foundations
and may reflect a wasteful hoarding of the charitable dollar. This may,
or may not, have an adverse effect on the economy. To aggregate the
accumulations within both the foundation-controlled business and the
foundation itself for the section 531 surtax is, in many ways, to mix
apples and pears. There is merit in an attempt to deal with the accumu-
lations at the corporate level. There can be little doubt that the
treatment of accumulations at the foundation level should be carefully
reviewed, but it is doubtful that the two issues should be confused.
Concerning the treatment of unreasonable accumulations at the
foundation level, Representative Patman makes two recommendations
that should be given prompt consideration. In Recommendation 14,
he wisely suggests that the accumulations of foundations related
through common control should be aggregated.4'
Under Recommendation 13,42 Representative Patman would have
all capital gains of the foundation treated as income for purposes of
unreasonable accumulations. The Regulations now provide that
gains representing the original spread between the market value of any
asset at the time of its donation and the substituted (donor's) basis in
the hands of the foundation will not be considered as income for pur-
poses of the rule." This seems a reasonable extension of the present
policy which would encourage charitable giving by measuring the
donor's deduction by reference to market value rather than to his basis.
Representative Patman, it should be noted, would rather limit the
charitable deduction to the donor's basis.44 In view of this, it is rea-
4 1 For the purpose of computing the accumulation of income, amounts un-
reasonably accumulated in corporations controlled by a foundation should be
added to the foundation's direct accumulation as if the two were one. The
use of subsidiary corporations should not be permitted to cloak actual accumu-
lations ....
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 134.
42 For the purposes of figuring the accumulation of income, contributions
to a foundation and all capital gains of the foundation should be considered as
income, and not capital. Both the original contribution and the income from
it are ordinarily available to the foundation without distinction.
This would eliminate a device for avoiding unreasonable accumulation of
income: contributions from one donor-controlled foundation to other founda-
tions controlled by the same donor.
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 134.
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.504-1 (c) (1) (1958).
44 [W]here a contribution to a foundation is made in property as distin-
guished from cash, the deduction would be figured at cost or value, whichever
is lower. At present it is figured on value. In all cases, as a result, appre-
[Vol.l12:190
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sonable to suppose that he would include the original spread between
basis and market value at the time of contribution in considering the
question of unreasonable accumulations. It is doubtful that the unfair
advantage now given to the potential donor who happens to have low
basis assets over the potential donor who does not, or the loss in
revenue involved, justifies the removal of this encouragement to
charitable giving. So long as the policy of such encouragement is
adhered to, there is little reason for penalizing the foundation that
receives low basis high market value assets by counting the subsequent
realization of that spread for purposes of the rule against accumulations.
Quite a different matter are the gains made by the foundation in
the sale or exchange of its assets based on the market value of such
assets when donated to it. If such gains are not counted for purposes
of the rule against accumulations, a foundation can confine itself to
"growth" investments with a low income yield and simply grow in
size and economic power at both the taxpayer's expense and that of
the charitable purposes it is supposed to serve. Yet the Regulations,
apparently unsupported by any specific language in the Code, allow,
for purposes of the rule against accumulations, the exclusion of gains
upon assets held for the production of investment income if reinvested
within a reasonable time for the same purpose."
The area of foundation accumulation is in need of further scrutiny
and, perhaps, reform. Representative Patman's challenge here should
not be dismissed lightly. If accumulations go unchecked, if foundations
are allowed to engage in large scale commercial lending, and if founda-
tion speculations on the market are not watched or controlled, such
accumulations can have very adverse effects on the economy. Repre-
sentative Patman has, therefore, wisely presented a recommendation
addressed to foundation speculation. Recommendation 8 states:
"Another area that needs consideration is that of investments. There
is a sharp difference between investing in securities and speculating or
trading in securities." There can be little doubt that this area should
be carefully reviewed.
ciation escapes tax to the point where high-bracket taxpayers can actually
enrich themselves by giving to foundations instead of selling the property.
As an alternative, the difference between value and cost should be added
to the contributor's taxable income as a condition to the deduction. At the
very least, shouldn't the tax profit on charity giving be eliminated?
Where stock is given to a controlled foundation, the value-for purposes
of determining the amount of the deductions-should be reduced by the value
of the voting power over the stock that, in effect, has been reserved by the
contributor.
Recommendation 11, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 134.
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.504-1(c) (2) (1958). Compare, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 504(a) (1).
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Recommendation 7 states: "Standards should be established with
respect to foundation behavior in a proxy fight." The tone of this
recommendation suggests Representative Patman's personal distaste
for the spectacle of a charitable institution which engages in bitter
proxy fights. The recommendation should not, however, be rejected
out of hand. Inasmuch as a proxy fight represents an aggressive ex-
pression of business judgment, the foundation is brought closer, for
better or for worse, to active participation in the business.
Recommendation 5 would prohibit foundation or donor solicita-
tion of contributions from suppliers or users. Since it is addressed
broadly to what may be considered unethical methods of obtaining
charitable contributions, the recommendation should be noted. But
unless such contribution may inure to the benefit of the donor, or be
to his business advantage, its solicitation from a supplier or user,
though unethical, would seem to have no direct bearing on business
competition.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER FOUNDATIONS
Representative Patman frequently complains about the laxity of
administrative supervision over foundation activities, particularly by
the Internal Revenue Service.
Recommendation 17 states that: "Consideration should be given
to a regulatory agency for the supervision of tax-exempt foundations."
It is a mistake to blame the Internal Revenue Service for the doubts
which are finding expression not only in this Report but, with increas-
ing frequency, in the general news media concerning the activities of
tax-exempt foundations and trusts. In response to Representative
Patman's concern, the Service has, in fact, tightened its supervision
over tax-exempt foundations and trusts. Form 990-A has been re-
vised to expand the reporting requirements. These requirements now
include data concerning salaries of officers; data on aggregate income
accumulation, allocated between ordinary income and capital gains;
and full data on corporate stocks held. The form must be filed in
duplicate and is open to public inspection.4" In a recent speech,47 Com-
missioner Caplin explained a change in the pattern of audit in this field.
He stated that the Service will no longer concentrate on the "most
productive" situations-that is, those in which deficiencies seemed
most likely-but rather will examine with more frequency areas which
may produce no deficiencies.
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1 (a) (4) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6645, 1963-17 Cum.
BuLL. 10. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1, 27 Fed. Reg. 10489 (1962).
47 Delivered Jan. 31, 1963, before the Foundation Luncheon Group, New York
City.
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It is not, however, on account of the readiness of the Service to
intensify its supervision over tax-exempt foundations that we ought
to refrain from blaming it for the supposed state of affairs. The
supervision of tax-exempt foundations cannot be left to a revenue
service alone. The function of a revenue service, after all, is to produce
revenue. Revenue measures, it is true, are far from neutral on the
subject of social or economic policy. It is, however, unrealistic and,
if we may be so bold to say, unfair to look to the Revenue Service for
a detailed implementation of such policies. Commissioner Caplin
echoes this when he says, "the Internal Revenue Service is not the
proper agency to exercise truly effective supervisory control." 4 If an
existing tax arrangement produces the same return as might be pro-
duced by another arrangement arguably less objectionable on some
point of economic or social policy, we cannot expect the Service to rise
up in righteous wrath and seek to change the pattern-particularly
when the tax legality of the present arrangement is not seriously in
question.
Suppose, for example, that a business corporation wholly owned
by a foundation pays rather large salaries to its officers and directors
who also happen to be the foundation trustees, but that such salaries
are not claimed as deductions on the corporate tax returns. Suppose
that the business of the corporation has grown rather rapidly in the past
several years and dividends have been very scant. It is not clear that,
under these circumstances, the tax exemption of the foundation can be
revoked. Certainly, if the salaries are not claimed as deductions there
is no loss in tax collection at the corporate level. Similarly, the Rev-
enue Service cannot be expected to police foundation speculation in the
securities market or the policies which foundations employ in com-
mercial lending of money.
We are convinced, however, that a proper approach to adminis-
trative supervision of foundations should begin at the state level.
Charitable objects and purposes are traditionally a matter of state
concern. Many of the alleged abuses of foundation and trust charitable
giving have a local impact and are factually confined to the local set-
ting. It would be unfortunate if these matters fell within the control
and supervision of centralized federal agencies. No effort should be
spared to examine and to improve, if need be, the existing machinery
at the state level for supervision of foundation activities; otherwise
Representative Patman's recommendation for creation of a supervisory
federal commission to contr6l the establishment and administration of
foundations could become a reality.
48 Ibid.
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Indeed, continued abuses by foundations and, perhaps more sig-
nificantly, continued public suspicion of their existence, if left unchecked
or unallayed, may eventually result in drastic public action. This
might lead to the liquidation of all existing foundations and the pro-
hibition of their use under the proposition that all altruistic giving
must be demonstrated and accomplished only by transfers made di-
rectly to public commissions or trusts 49 created by federal, state, and
municipal branches of the government for general eleemosynary or
public purposes, the only exception being private gifts to religious
organizations and institutions. As Professor Sacks observed,5 the
issue of charitable giving is not an issue on which temperate, reasoned
reactions have prevailed. Another serious crisis in the foundation field
may move the public to destroy this form of charitable expression. We
believe, therefore, that Representative Patman's Report should not be
lightly, or conveniently, dismissed.
49 A striking example of such a trust is to be found in the Board of City Trusts
of the City of Philadelphia which has been in existence since 1869. The Board was
established to take over the functions previously exercised by the City of Philadelphia.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 16365-70 (1957). The constitutionality of the act which
created the Board was upheld in Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870), and it was
this Board that was involved in the historic Girard trust litigation. See Girard Will
Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 353 U.S. 230 (1957);
Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, appeal dismissed,
357 U.S. 570 (1958).
50 See Sacks, Use and Misuse of the Private Foundation, in NEw YORK UNi-
VERSITY FIFrH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS, PROCEEDINGS
203, 216-17 (1961).
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